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NOTES AND COMMENTS 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE UNDER ATTACK 
Analysis of three cases-Harris u. New York, United States u. 
Calandra and Michigan u. Tucker-reueals a systematic attack by 
the current Supreme Court on the exclusionary concept in 
search and seizure and self-incrimination cases. The author 
examines the Court's treatment of precedent cases and explores 
the logical framework of the erosion of the excluSionary rule's 
protections accorded persons accused of crime. 
Those assessing the Nixon Presidency may conclude that one of its 
most significant legacies is the effect of his. realignment of the Supreme 
Court on the criminal justice system. Four vacancies occurring in his 
first administration gave Mr. Nixon an opportunity to mold the Court 
in his own image.1 The new majority created by his appointments has, 
in only three years, made substantial inroads into major criminal 
decisions of the Warren Court. Further limitations on the protections 
accorded those accused or suspected of ,crime could'lead to the undoing 
of the Warren "revolution." 
The immediate target of the present Court seems to be the abolition 
of the exclusionary rule2 and its corollary doctrine, "the fruit of the 
poisonous tree.,,3 A series of cases decided since 1971 has undermined 
the force of the rule.4 Two decisions announced in the first half of 
1. Four months after taking office (May 21, 1969) Richard Nixon nominated Warren E. 
Burger to replace retiring Chief Justice Earl Warren. On May 15. 1969. Justice Abe Fortas 
resigned. A year later (May 12, 1970), after Senate rejection of successive nominations of 
Clement Haynsworth and G. Harold Carswell. the appointment of Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun was approved. In September 1971, Justices Hugo L. Black and John Marshall 
Harlan both retired. The following month Mr. Nixon nominated Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and 
William H. Rehnquist to the Court. The Senate approved Justice Powell's apPointment 
on December 6, 1971, and Justice Rehnquisfs four days later. The Court was then, Nixon 
told a presa conference, "as balanced as I can make it." The Washington Post, Jan. 20, 
1973, at CoS. 
2. The principle, sometimes called the "suppression doctrine," is that evidence obtained by 
means of illegal. government activity is not admissible against one whose constitutional 
rights have been violated by that activity. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
3. The prohibition is of the use of evidence derived from evidence which has been illegally 
seized. The phrase originated with Justice Frankfurter, Nardone v. United States. 30S 
U.S. 33S, 341 (1939), but the principle dates from Justice Holmes' statement in 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920): "The essence of a 
provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely 
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at 
all." 1d. at 392. 
4. Scheneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 21S (1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S: 443 (1971) (dissenting opinion); Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) 
(dissenting opinion). 
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1974, United States v. Calandras and Michigan v. Tucker, 6 weaken still 
further both the rule and the corollary. 
Chief Justice Burger came to the Court with a record of opposition 
to the exclusionary rule and support of the common law principle that 
so long as evidence is competent, the courts will not inquire into the 
means by which it was obtained.7 At his earliest opportunity he made 
known the course he hoped the Supreme Court, under his leadership, 
would adopt with regard to suppression of illegally obtained evidence. 
In a lengthy and detailed dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 8 Chief Justice Burger 
wrote: 
For more than 55 years this Court has enforced a rule under 
which evidence of undoubted reliability and probative value has 
been suppressed and excluded from criminal cases whenever it 
was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment .... The 
rule has rested on a theory that suppression of evidence in these 
circumstances was imperative to deter law enforcement author-
ities from using improper methods to obtain evidence .... If an 
effective alternative remedy is available, concern for official 
observance of the law does not require adherence to the exclu-
sionary rule .... 
Although I would hesitate to abandon it until some mean-
ingful substitute is developed, the history of the Suppression 
Doctrine demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and 
practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective.9 
5. 414 u.s. 338 (1974). 
6. _U.S._ 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974). 
7. See, e.g., Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman? 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1964). The 
common-law rule, defined in 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961) 
was approved by the Supreme Court in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). Adams 
quoting from 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 245a noted: "It may be mentioned in this place 
that though papers and other subjects of evidence may have been illegally taken from the 
possession of the party against whom they are offered or otherwise unlawfully obtained, 
this is no valid objection to their admissibility if they are pertinent to the issue. The Court 
will not take notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it 
form an issue to determine that question." 192 U.S. at 595. 
8. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens held that a Fourth Amendment violation by federal agents 
gives rise to a federal cause of action for damages. although there is no express statutory 
authorization for such a remedy. 
9. [d. at 413-15. In the remainder of the Bivens dissent the Chief Justice outlined a 
legislative proposal for a "meaningful substitute" for exclusion. It included: (a) waiver of 
sovereign immunity; (b) creation of a cause of action for damages sustained by any person 
aggrieved by conduct of governmental agents in violation of the Fourth Amendment or 
statutes regulating official conduct; (c) creation of a special tribunal to adjudicate all 
claims under the statute; (d) a provision that this statutory remedy is in lieu of the 
exclusion of evidence secured for use in criminal cases in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment; and (e) a provision directing that no evidence, otherwise admissible, shall 
be excluded from any criminal proceeding because of violation ofthe Fourth Amendment. 
S. 881, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), introduced by Senator Lloyd Bensten (D. Tex.) in 
February 1973, follows the Burger guidelines. Damages would not be assessed against the 
offending agent, but directly against the United States, on the theory of respondeat 
superior. The measure provides no remedy for violations by state officers, a problem the 
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In the same dissent the Chief Justice also suggested the strategy he 
felt the Court should follow in attacking the exclusionary rule, at least 
in search and seizure cases: 
I do not propose, however, that we abandon the suppression 
doctrine until some meaningful alternative can be developed. In 
a sense our legal system has become the captive of its own 
creation. To overrule Weeks and Mapp, even assuming the Court 
was now prepared to take that step, could raise yet new prob-
lems. Obviously the public interest would be poorly served if 
law enforcement officials were suddenly to gain the impression, 
however erroneous, that all constitutional restraints on police 
had somehow been removed-that an open season on "crimi-
nals" had been declared. I am concerned lest some such mis-
taken impression might be fostered by a flat overruling of the 
suppression doctrine cases. For years we have relied upon it as 
the exclusive remedy for unlawful official conduct; in a sense 
we are in a situation akin to the narcotics addict whose depen-
dence on drugs precludes any drastic or immediate withdrawal 
of the supposed prop, regardless of how futile its continued use 
may be.1 0 
The present Court's decisions dealing with the exclusionary rule have 
followed this policy of gradual withdrawal. They have limited, eroded 
and contradicted earli~r suppression cases, especially Mapp v. Ohio1 1 
and Miranda v. Arizona. 1 2 They have nullified important aspects of 
these and other decisions protective of the rights of the accused.! 3 But 
Chief Justice dismisses by saying, "Once the constitutional vali~ity of such a statute is 
established, it can reasonably be assumed that the States would develop their own 
remedial systems on the "federal model." 403 U.S. at 423-24. This, of course, also 
assumes-not so reasonably-that the states would waive sovereign immunity to suit in 
such cases. Any action under such a measure would naturally be subject to all tort 
defenses, including good faith. 
10. Id. at 420-21. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), announced the same 
day as Bivens, the Chief Justice continued the theme: "This case illustrates graphically 
the monstrous price we pay for the exclusionary rule in which we seem to have imprisoned 
ourselves." 403 U.S. at 493. Coolidge, holding inadmissible evidence seized under a 
warrant authorized by a prosecuting attorney rather than by a neutral magistrate, and 
rejecting the same evidence under the "plain view" doctrine because its discovery was not 
inadvertent, found three Justices, Burger, Blackmun and Black, in agreement that the 
Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would not support an exclusionary rule. Justice 
White also dissented from the Coolidge holding, but on the ground that the Fourth 
Amendment was satisfied. Chief Justice Burger declined to accept the proposition, 
advanced by Justice Black in both Coolidge and Mapp, that the Fifth Amendment 
requires exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
11. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
13. The present Court's treatment of the Warren Court decisions of Gilbert v. California, 388 
U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illi!}ois, 378 U.S. 478 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961); and Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), as well as the earlier cases of 
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 
251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); and Counselman v. 
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they have not openly and candidly overruled them, announcing new 
law to take their place. This comment will assess the current status of 
the exclusionary principle, and examine critically the methods the 
present Court has employed to attack it. 
THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Most of the twentieth century courts have excluded evidence re-
sulting from illegal searches and seizures,l 4 coerced confessions, 1 5 
and compulsory self-incrimination.1 6 The Warren Court made the ex-
clusionary rule binding on the states,1 7 clarified the bases for its 
application, and increased the number of contexts in which illegally 
obtained evidence would be suppressed. Having held the privilege 
against self-incrimination applicable to the states,1 8 it applied that 
privilege to the admissibility of confessions.1 9 It then extended the 
HitChcock, 142 u.S. 547 (1892) will be developed more fully in the text and subsequent 
notes. 
14. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), enunciated the rule for search and seizure 
cases. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applied it to the states, after Wolfv. Colorado, 
338 U.S. 25 (1949), had held that freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures was a 
right protected against invasion by the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
search and seizure cases exclusion is grounded on the Fourth Amendment. Justice Black 
consistently maintained that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would not support 
the principle, but that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, taken together, as in Agnello v. 
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S: 616 (1886), 
compelled exclusion. Thus when he found no Fifth Amendment violation Justice Black 
refused to apply the exclusionary rule. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) 
(Black, J., dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Black, J., concurring). 
15. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
Early cases found authority for the exclusion of evidence, either physical or testimonial, 
extracted from a defendant by brutal or shocking methods in the concept of due process. 
Hence the rule in this context was applied to the states as early as 1936. See, e.g., 
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 
(1940). 
16. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), held that a defendant could not be 
compelled to give self-incriminating testimony unless he was granted immunity from 
prosecution co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege, and that the government 
was barred from both direct and derivative use of such testimony. See also Ullman v. 
United States, 3..'\0 U.S. 422 (1956); Shapiro v. United States, 355 U.S. 1 (1948); Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
17. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
18. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
19. Writing for the majority in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), Justice Brennan 
re-examined the history of suppression of coerced confessions. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 
U.S. 78 (1908), had held that the Fifth Amendment privilege was not a "fundamental 
right" and hence was not applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), Justice Brennan conceded, had 
felt impelled in light of the Twining decision, to base exclusion on the common-law 
confession rationale and to say that its holding did not involve self-incrimination. He 
concluded: "But this distinction was soon abandoned, and today the admissibility of a 
confession in a state criminal prosecution is tested by the same standard applied in 
federal prosecutions since 1897, when, in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, the Court 
held that '[i)n criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question 
arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled 
1974] Exclusionary Rule Under Attack 93 
Fifth Amendment's exclusionary rule to police interrogation of a sus-
pect in custody20 and to identification testimony derived from im-
properly conducted lineups.2 I It also defined important limitations to 
the rule,22 chief among which was the requirement that standing to 
invoke it is predicated on an invasion of one's own constitutional 
rights-that one may not vicariously assert the rights of another.2 3 
Growing out of the concept of exclusion was the doctrine of the 
"fruit of the poisonous tree," which bars secondary exploitation of the 
primary illegality.2 4 Not only is illegally obtained evidence subject to 
exclusion, but other evidence derived from it is suppressed as well. The 
Warren Court, although it narrowed the doctrine somewhat,25 ex-
tended its application to verbal as well as tangible material.2 6 
As the . law stood when the present Court was assembled, one who 
was personally aggrieved was entitled, in a federal or a state court, to 
suppression of physical evidence, a statement or confession, or identi-
fication testimony unlawfully obtained by state agents. The govern-
ment was not permitted to profit from its illegal activity. Unless the 
by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself." , " 378 U.S. at 6-7. For discussion of confessions ane;! self-incrimination, 
see L. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT-THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
(1968); Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935 (1966). 
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda based exclusion on both the Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination clause and the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of 
counsel, which the Court said was essential to make the Fifth Amendment guarantee 
meaningful in the interrogation setting. 
In Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) and McNabb v. United States, 318 
U.S. 332 (1943), which held inadmissible confessions obtained from a suspect held an 
unduly long time without being arraigned before a magistrate, the exclusionary rule was 
applied as a rule of evidence only, based on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court 
over the lower federal courts. Since this power derived directly from FED. R. CRlM. 
P. 5(a), the McNabb-Mallory rule does not apply to the states. See Culombe v. Connecti-
cut, 367 U.S. 568, 598-602 (1961). 
21. The companion decisions, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v. 
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), grounded the exclusion of a witness' identification of a 
suspect based on a lineup at which the accused was denied the assistance of counsel on 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, as well as due process. 
22. These are in addition to the constitutional limitation that illegally obtained evidence will 
be excluded only when significant state action was involved in its production. 
23. The leading standing cases have concerned illegal searches and seizures. Jones v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), rejected the "subtle distinctionll" of common-law property 
concepts which courts had employed for many years to deny standing to those who had no 
possessory interest in the premises invaded, holding that "anyone legitimately on 
premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality.by way of a motion to suppress, 
when its fruits are proposed to be used against him." [d. at 267. Alderman v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), held, however, that Fourth Amendment rights are personal 
and may not be vicariously asserted. Alderman decided that one has no standing to sup-
press evidence unlawfully seized from another, but must establish that the illegal search 
aggrieved him personally. 
24. Note 3 supra. 
25. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), granted the prosecution a limited right to use 
otherwise inadmissible evidence to impeach a defendant's trial testimony on matters 
collateral to his guilt or innocence. 
26. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
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prosecution could show that the evidence in question derived from an 
independent, legal source,27 the courts were required to prohibit its 
indirect use.28 The rule applied to anything of evidentiary value, no 
matter how trustworthy it might be.2 9 
From the time of the exclusionary rule's announcement in Weeks v. 
United States30 until the start of the present decade, the unmistakable 
trend was toward its expansion and extension into new areas. The 
present Court has begun a process of contraction and limitation. Four 
important decisions before 1974 signaled a course toward more tolerant 
standards of admissibility. Harris v. New York,31 which will be exam-
ined in detail, held that a defendant's statements made to police in the 
absence of adequate Miranda warnings are admissible to impeach his 
testimony at trial. . 
Kastigar v. United States, 3 2 which upheld a "use immunity" stat-
ute,3 3 reduced the scope of immunity required to be ~Tanted one 
compelled to give self-incriminating testimony.34 Kastigar held that, 
since the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply unless the witness 
is exposed to possible criminal penalties,3 5 only the compelled testi-
mony itself, or any evidence derived from it, will be excluded in a 
subsequent criminal prosecution of the witness. The government is not 
foreclosed, as courts for eighty years had held it was,36 from future 
prosecution for the offense or "transaction" to which the testimony 
relates. 
In 1972, in Kirby v. Illinois,3 7 the Court limited the number of 
situatiorts in which identification testimony would be suppressed. 
United States v. Wade38 and Gilbert v. California39 had announced a 
27. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
28. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). The ban on indirect use is not, however, 
absolute. As the connection between the illegal activity and the evidence sought to be 
introduced grows more tenuous, the taint becomes "dissipated," and the evidence may be 
admitted. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
29. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). 
30. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
31. 404 U.S. 222 (1971). 
32. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
33. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 (1970). 
34. See also Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S 472 (1972); 
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971). 
35. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 ... [The I sole concern [of the privilege I is ... with 
the danger to a witness forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of 'penalties 
affixed to the criminal acts ... .' Immunity displaces the danger. Once the reason for the 
privilege ceases, the privilege ceases." [d. at 438-39, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 634 (1886). 
36. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892). "We are clearly of the opinion 
that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers 
the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege 
conferred by the Co~stitution of the United States .... In view of the constitutional 
provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against fu-
ture prosecution for the offence to which the question relates." See also Ullman v. 
t:nited States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
37. 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
38. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
39. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
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rule of per se exclusion of identifications based on lineups at which 
the suspect was denied the assistance of counsel. Kirby held that the 
Wade-Gilbert rule does not apply to lineups held before the accused was 
under indictment. This was an apparent, though tacit, reversal, since 
cases denying retroactivity to the rule, as well as subsequent applica-
tions of it, had dealt with pre-indictment lineups.40 Although the 
Kirby Court distinguished the underlying basis of Miranda, 41 its reason-
ing that the right to counsel does not attach before "the initiation of 
adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal 
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment't4 2 
appears to mark a turning away from that decision.4 3 
In 1973, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,44 the Court refused to 
extend the requirement of Miranda-type warnings to the search and 
seizure context. Evidence will not be excluded because of the state's 
failure to prove that one who consented to a search knew, or was 
notified, that he had the right to withhold his consent.4 5 
With these decisions the Court arrested the expansion of the exclu-
sionary rule. Within a six-month period, it dealt the doctrine two 
further blows. United States v. Calandra,4 6 decided in January 1974, 
held that a grand jury witness who has been granted immunity from 
prosecution has no standing to invoke the exclusionary rule to bar 
questions based on evidence illegally seized from him. Michigan v. 
Tucker,47 announced in June, decided that when a suspect is interro-
gated without being given full Miranda warnings, the testimony of a 
witness whose identity was learned through that interrogation is admis-
sible at trial, when the witness himself is available for cross-examina-
tion.48 
40. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See also 
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). 
41. "[Tlhe Miranda decision was based exclusively upon the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment privilege against compulsory self· incrimination. upon the theory that 
custodial interrogation is inherently coercive." 406 U.S. at 688. Kirby, said the Court, 
concerned only the right to counsel; the privilege against self· incrimination was "in no 
way implicated." ld. at 687. 
42. ld. at 689. 
43. Writing for the majority in Kirby, Stewart, J., said: "The initiation of judicial criminal 
proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of 
adverRary criminal justice. For it is only then that the Government has committed itself 
to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of Government and defendant have 
solidified." 406 U.S. at 689. This is a decided departure from Miranda's statement that 
"our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences" when "the individual is first 
subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of 
his freed9m of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 477. The "starting point" 
language of Kirby also appears to restrict the principle of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 
478 (1964), which held that pre·indictment interrogation is a "critical stage" of criminal 
proceedings, during which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. 
44. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
45. This also appears to repudiate the philosophical basis of Miranda, that one cannot make 
an intelligent waiver of a right unless he knows that the right exists, and that the only way 
to be sure he knows is not to rely on presumption, but to tell him. 
46. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
47. _U.S.-. 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974). 
48. This is the question expressly left open in Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), 
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In both of these cases the Court went beyond its narrow holdings to 
issue broad pronouncements redefining the limitations and purposes of 
the exclusionary rule. So inimical are these declarations to the doctrine 
as twentieth-century courts have developed it that Justice Brennan, in 
dissent from the opinion in Calandra, was moved to sound a note of 
alarm: 
In Mapp, the Court thought it had "close[d] the only court-
room door remaining open to evidence secured by official 
lawlessness" in violation of Fourth Amendment rights. The 
door is again ajar. As a consequence, I am left with the uneasy 
feeling that today's decision may signal that a majority of my 
colleagues have positioned themselves to reopen the door still 
further and abandon the exclusionary rule in search and seizure 
caseS.49 
An examination of the methods that this Court has employed to 
diminish the exclusionary rule without the necessity of "any drastic or 
immediate withdrawal of the supposed prop"s 0 -i.e., without over-
ruling Weeks, Mapp and Miranda and the cases that rely on them-is 
illuminating. Careful study of three cases, Calandra, Tucker and the 
1971 decision Harris II. New YorkS 1 discloses a disconcerting reliance 
on selective reasoning, manipulation and sometimes outright misstate-
ment of controlling precedent.s 2 
HARRIS V. NEW YORK 
The Harris opinion gave the new Chief Justice an opportunity to try 
the strategy he would later urge in Billens. S 3 He seriously weakened 
Miranda, but did not withdraw its support altogether. Harris has been 
thoroughly analyzed.s 4 It merits attention here, however, because it 
provided a foundation for the decision in Tucker. 
which held that since the defendant's testimony at his first trial was the fruit of an 
illegally obtained confession, it could not be introduced at his retrial. The Court said: 
"We have no occasion in this case to canvass the complex and varied problems that arise 
when the trial testimony of a witness other than the accused is challenged as 'the eventi-
ary product of the poisoned trp-e. '" 329 U.S. at 223 n.9. 
49. 414 U.S. at 365 (citation omitted). 
50. Note 10 supra. 
51. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
52. Dershowitz and Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and 
Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1201-08 (1971), present a 
convincing argument that the Harris opinion also involved misrepresentation of the 
record. 
53. Harris was decided sQme four months before Bivens and Coolidge. 
54. Excellent examinations of its reasoning and implications are Dershowitz and Ely, Harris 
v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging 
Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971); Kent, Harris v. New York: The Death Knell of 
Miranda and Walder?, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 357 (1971); Admitting the Inadmissible: The 
Wounding of Miranda, 23 BAYLOR L. REv. 639 (1971); and Note, Harris v. New York-A 
Retreat from Miranda, 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 118 (1971). 
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Harris was arrested for selling heroin to an undercover police officer. 
Before questioning him, the police told him of his right to be silent, of 
possible evidentiary use of any statement he might make, and of his 
right to consult an attorney. They did not tell him of his right to 
court-appointed council.s 5 He eventually gave the police an incriminat-
ing statement, which the prosecution did not introduce in its case in 
chief. Taking the stand at trial, Harris claimed that he had actually sold 
baking powder, intending to defraud the purchaser. 
On cross-examination Harris was confronted with the transcript of 
his interrogation. Although the transcript was not shown to the jury, 
the prosecutor read the questions and answers from it. Harris' answers 
on cross-examination were wholly inconsistent with parts of his prior 
statement. The trial court instructed the jury that it should consider the 
statement only in relation to the defendant's credibility, and not as 
evidence of his guilt. The jury convicted on one count of the two-count 
indictment. 
Harris testified on cross-examination that he did remember making a 
statement, but he was vague in recalling what he had said. Queried on 
his poor memory, he replied, "My joints was down and I needed 
drugs ... S6 He admitted that he was a heroin addict. 
The Court, in an eleven-paragraph opinion, ruled that the uncoun-
seled statement was admissible to impeach the defendant's trial testi-
mony, "provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence 
satisfies legal standards."s 7 
Leaving aside the question of the legal trustworthiness of the state-
ment, made while under arrest, of an addict experienCing withdrawal, 
the majority's treatment of the two cases on which it purports to rely 
prompts some concern. 
To deal with the self-incrimination question, the Court first had to 
come to terms with Miranda. Six federal courts of appeal and appellate 
courts of fourteen states had interpreted that decision as making no 
55. The interrogation took place before Miranda was decided, but since the trial was after 
Miranda, under the rule of Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), Miranda applied: 
56. 401 U.S. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
57. 1d. at 224. Chief Justice Burger by implication resurrects the trustworthiness rationale 
of the coerced confession rule, see Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941), which 
had been on the decline for years before being laid to rest in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 
534, 540-41 (1961): "Our decisions under [the Fourteenth) Amendment have made clear 
that convictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are involun-
tary, i.e., the product of coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot stand. This is 
not so because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to 
extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of ot:r law: that ours is an 
accusatorial and not inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish 
guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its 
charge against an accused out of his own mouth." 
The Chief Justice has long supported the trustworthiness premise. Writing in dissent 
in Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1959), which concerned a statement 
obtained in violation of the Mallory rule, then Judge Burger wrote: "A coerced confession 
is rejected because it is not a true statement but one exacted by duress or force and thus 
inherently unreliable. A confession rejected under Rule 5(a) for 'unnecessary delay' is 
not discredited as inherently untrustworthy; it is rejected as a means of enforcing Rule 
5(a)-a prophylactic suppression." 1d. at 921, n.l. 
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"distinction between statements used on direct as opposed to cross-
examination."s8 Harris, however, evaded the Miranda barrier by brand-
ing as dictum, and therefore "not controlling," one of Miranda's im-
portant explicative passages. The Chief Justice wrote: 
Some coknments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read 
as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any 
purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessw:y to 
the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling. 
Miranda barred the prosecution from making its case with 
statements of an accused made while in custody prior to having 
or effectively waiving counsel. It does not follow from Miranda 
that evidence inadmissible against -an accused in the ptosecu-
tion's case in chief is barred for all purposes .... 5 9 
One passage in Miranda that "can indeed be read" to bar use for any 
purpose of a statement obtained without giving all four of the required 
warnings is the following: 
·The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accord-
ance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully 
effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any 
statement made by a defendant. No distinction can be drawn 
between statements which are direct confessions and statements 
which amount to "admissions" of part or all of an offense. The 
privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from 
being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does 
not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely 
the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpa-
tory statements and statements alleged to be merely "excul-
patory." If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it 
would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact, 
statements merely intented to be eXCUlpatory by the defendant 
are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demon-
strate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and 
thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incrim-
inating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be 
used without full warnings and effective waiver required for any 
other statement.6 0 
58. 401 U.S. 222, 231 (dissenting opinion), and cases cited note 4 supra, including Franklin v. 
State: 6 Md. App. 572, 252 A.2d 487 (1969). 
59. 401 U.S. at 224. . 
60. 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966) (emphasis added). This is not the first time this Court has 
branded an important passage in an earlier case as dictum and therefore "not control-
ling." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), stated that only absolute immunity 
could supplant the Fifth Amendment privilege. Two later cases, Adams v. Maryland, 
347 U.S. 179, 182 (1954) and United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931), had called 
this the principle of Counselman. Nevertheless, the present Court, in Kastigar v. United 
States. 406 U.S. 411, 455 (1972), said that this statement was in the context of anllillary 
points, not necessary to the holding. 
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This language, though not essential for reversal of the four convic· 
tions under review in Miranda, unmistakably conveys the Court's think· 
ing concerning the exact situation found in Harris and the precise use to 
which the defendant's statement was put.6 1 
If the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause has been violated, 
it is not the Court but the Constitution that demands exclusion. Yet in 
discussing Miranda's requirement of suppression of testimony obtained 
from a defendant without a knowing, intelligent waiver of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, Chief Justice Burger makes no mention of the 
exclusionary rule contained in the Amendment itself.6 2 Instead, he 
predicates suppression on deterrence of police misconduct6 3 -a ration-
ale that, when acknowledged, has largely been confined to se'arch and 
. seizure cases,64 and has no place in a self-incrimination setting. The 
following language in Harris, then, seems incongruous in its Fifth 
Amendment context: "Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deter-
rent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows 
when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in 
its case in chief.'t6 5 
Even if this assertion were constitutionally sound, its reasoning avoids 
reality. In practical application Harris holds out a strong inducement to 
police to violate Miranda's command if they cannot get a statement by 
complying with it. Suppose, for example, that a suspect is given the 
Miranda warnings and starts to answer questions, then changes his mind 
and asks that the interrogation be stopped. The officer will be greatly 
tempted to continue, knowing that if he does compel. a confession, it 
can be used to impeach any testimony the defendant offers-if the mere 
fact of the prosecution's having it does not keep the defendant off the 
stand in the first place. Since the state's case seldom depends entirely 
on the defendant's statement, without corroborating testimony (as it 
may on illegally seized physical evidence), losing the use of such a 
statement in the case in chief may be a small price to pay for the 
61. That this was the result intended by the Miranda Court is indicated by the fact that the 
equation of admissions and "exculpatory" statements to confessions drew specific 
criticism in each of the three dissenting opinions filed in Miranda. 384 U.S. 436, 502 
(Clark, J., dissenting and concurring); [d. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting); [d. at 535 
(White, J., dissenting). 
62. "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 
63. This is an old theme for the Chief Justice. Two years before Miranda was decided he 
wrote: "We Bee thus that the Supreme Court has steered a waivering course-Justice 
Jackson called it 'inconstant and inconsistent'-in explaining the suppression of evidence 
obtained by official illegality. At times, confusing and even contradictory rationales have 
been put forward. But despite this groping, the Court now appears to have settled upon 
the need for deterrence of police violations as the principal reaEon for suppression." 
Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman? 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
64. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled in part, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 365 U.S. 206 (1960); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 
(1954). 
65. 4Ol"U.S. 222, 225 (1971). 
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prosecutorial advantage to be gained by (1) possibly preventing the 
defendant from testifying, and (2) acquiring a statement that may 
provide further investigatory leads, including the identities of witnesses' 
whose testimony now, under Tucker, will be admissible. 
An additional passage in Harris indicates a lack of sympathy with the 
central theme of Miranda: 
Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an 
obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecu-
tion here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing 
devices of the adversary process. Had inconsistent statements 
been made by the accused to some third person, it could hardly 
be contended that the conflict could not be laid before the jury 
by way of cross-examination and impeachment.6 6 
The apparent error is that Harris did not make his statement to 
"some third person," but to the police, in custodial interrogation-the 
very situation that Miranda went to exhaustive lengths to demonstrate 
as coercive.6 7 To fail to see a distinction between a casual remark to an 
acquaintance and a statement given to interrogating officers in a police 
station is to ignore Miranda's reasoning in extending the privilege 
against self-incrimination to the interrogation setting. 
Another case vitiated by the Harris Court was Walder v. United 
States. 68 It was on this case that Harris relied as direct precedent for 
permitting illegally produced evtdence to be used for impeachment.69 
Walder had once been indicted for purchasing and possessing heroin. 
The prosecution was dropped, following his successful motion to sup-
press the evidence. Two years later he was again indicted, on other 
narcotics charges. At trial he denied ever having bought, sold, possessed 
or given away any narcotics in his entire life. On cross-examination he 
reiterated these statements. The government then, over his objection, 
questioned him about the heroin capsule unlawfully siezed from him 
two years before. Denying that any narcotics had been taken from him, 
Walder flatly contradicted the affidavit he had filed in connection with 
his motion to suppress the evidence in the earlier proceeding. The 
government then called one of the officers who had taken part in the 
unlawful search and seizure and the chemist who had analyzed the 
capsule it produced. The trial judge admitted this evidence, charging the 
jury that it was not to be used to determine guilt or innocence, but 
solely to test the defendant's credibility. The conviction was affirmed. 
The difference between Walder's position and Harris' is apparent. If 
66. Id. at 325-26. 
67. Miranda dwells on the unique conditions existing in the police station, describing in 
detail the psychological techniques used by police to extract confessions. 384 U.S. 436, 
448-55 (1966). 
68. 347 U.S. 62 (1954). 
69. 401 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971). 
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the Walder jury chose to believe the government's rebutting evidence, it 
was led inevitably only to conclude that the defendant was not truth-
ful. It was not bound to convict him. The Harris jury could hardly do 
otherwise, if it believed the impeaching testimony. 
The Walder holding was expressly limited to rebuttal of collateral 
issues raised by the defense: 
Of course the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest 
opportunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be 
free to deny all elements of the case against him without 
thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of 
rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not 
available for its case in chief. 7 0 
This language, like that cited earlier from Miranda, seems clearly to 
deal with the precise situation found in Harris. 7 1 Certainly the defend-
ant was not "free to deny all elements of the case against him" when 
the government could impeach his denial by means of his own illegally 
obtained statement, directly incriminating him. Harris renders the limit-
ing language of Walder inoperative: 
It is true that Walder was impeached as to collateral matters 
included in his direct examination, whereas petitioner here was 
impeached as to testimony bearing more directly on the crimes 
charged. We are not persuaded that there is a difference in 
principle that warrants a result different from that reached by 
the court in Walder .... The impeachment process here un-
doubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing peti-
tioner's credibility, and the benefits of this process should not 
be lost, in our view, because of the speculative possibility that 
impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby. 72 
Surely the impeachment process was helpful to the jury, but the 
cost to the defendant was scarcely a "speculative possibility", since 
our Constitution recognizes a "difference in principle" between refus-
ing to allow one defendant to perjure himself on a collateral matter' 3 
and permitting the government to prove its case against another by 
flouting his Fifth Amendment privilege. The Harris Court advanced a 
policy justification for its holding: "The shield provided by Miranda 
70. 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954). 
71. Walder stated a very narrow exception to an important principle of Agnello v. United 
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), that evidence produced by means of an illegal search and 
seizure is not admissible in rebuttal when the defendant has not testified concerning it in 
his direct examination. 269 U.S. at 35. By ignoring Walder's express limitation of the 
application of its holding: the Harris Court appears to have overruled. without citing. this 
aspect of Agnello. 
72. 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). 
73. It was clear that Walder had, in fact, committed perjury, since both his earlier affidavit 
and his contradictory testimony were made under oath. Such was not the case with 
Harris. 
102 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 4 
cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, 
free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utter-
ances."74 
This pronouncement necessarily assumes that the defendant's un-
sworn statement, made in the "inherently coercive"75 atmosphere of 
station-house interrogation, when he had not seen an attorney, and was 
badly in need of drugs, IS true, whereas the testimony given in court, 
under oath, and with the assistance of counsel who himself had an 
interest in preventing perjury in his client, is false. The basis for such an 
assumption would seem to be that the defendant who says "I did it" is 
always telling the truth, and the one who says "I didn't" is always 
lying--which hardly comports with the presumption of inna.cence. 
The Court's justification further assumes that, on balance, the gov-
ernment's interest in preventing perjury outweighs the individual's 
right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. To strike such 
a balance gives little weight to a constitutional guarantee that has been 
called the "essential mainstay" of the adversary system.7 6 The govern-
ment has a ready remedy for perjury, in prosecution for that offense 
and imposition, following conviction, of the penalty affixed by law. It 
is both unnecessary and constitutionally impermissible for a court to 
assume perjury where none is proven and to punish it, without trial, by 
compelling a defendant to incriminate himself on another, unrelated 
charge. Harris was not asserting a right to perjure himself,7 7 any more 
than he was asserting a right to deal in narcotics. His claim was no more 
than the Constitution guarantee of the right to a trial free of the taint 
of self-incrimination. 
UNITED STATES V. CALANDRA 
In January, 1974, the Court carved another deep inroad into the 
exclusionary rule, and appeared to repudiate its constitutional bases as 
enunciated over the past sixty years since Weeks v. United States. 7 II 
United States v. Calandra, 7 9 in a 6-3 decision written by Justice Powell, 
held that a witness granted immunity from' prosecution must answer a 
grand jury's questions based on evidence obtained in violation of the 
witness' own Fourth Amendment rights. 
74 401 U.S. 222. 226 (1971). The terminology is borrowed from Walder: "[T)here is hardly 
justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in 
reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility:' 347 U.S. 62. 65 
(1954). 
75. This epithet. fIrSt used in Ashcraft v. Tennessee. 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (dissenting opinion). 
was accepted by the present Court in Kirby v. Illinois. 406 U.S. 682. 688 (1972). 
76. Malloy v. Hogan, !l78 U.S. 1.7 (1964). 
7":. The Court spoke of "right"· liS well as license: "Every criminal defendant is privileged to 
testify in his own defense. or to refuse to do suo But that privilege cannot be construed to 
include the right to commIt perjury:' 401 U.S. 222. 225. 
78. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
79. 414 U.S !l.'lfI /19741 
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In connection with an investigation of suspected illegal gambling, 
federal agents secured a warrant authorizing a search of John Calandra's 
place of business. The warrant specified that the object of the search 
was bookmaking records and wagering paraphernalia. Executing it, the 
agents conducted a thorough four-hour search of the two-story Royal 
Machine and Tool Company, spending more than three hours going 
through Calandra's office and flies. 
Although the agents found no gambling equipment, one discovered a 
card indicating that a certain doctor had been making periodic pay-
ments to Calandra. Aware that the U.S. Attorney's office had been 
investigating extortionate credit transactions, and that the doctor had 
been a victim of loan sharks, the agent seized the card. 
Three months later a special federal grand jury was convened to 
investigate possible loan-sharking activities. It subpoenaed Calandra to 
question him about the evidence seized during the earlier search. 
Calandra appeared, but refused to testify, invoking the Fifth Amend-
ment. The government then requested the district court to grant him 
transactional immunity, pursuant to the statute then in effect.80 
Calandra moved8 I for suppression and return of the evidence on the 
grounds that the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and 
that the search exceeded its scope. At a hearing on the motion, he 
stipulated that he would refuse to answer questions based on the seized 
materials. The district court granted the motion and ordered that 
Calandra need not answer any of the grand jury's questions based on 
the evidence, holding that: 
... there is a requirement of due process which allows a 
witness to litigate the question 9f whether the evidence which 
constitutes the basis for the questions asked of him before the 
grand jury has been obtained in a way which violates the 
constitutional protection against unlawful search and seizure.8 2 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that the district 
court had properly entertained the suppression motion and that a grand 
jury witness may invoke the exclusionary rule to bar questioning based 
on evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure, regardless of 
any grant of immunity.8 3 
Justice Powell reviewed at some length the history and purpose of 
the grand jury, paying particular attention to its inquisitorial function. 
The decision in this case, he said, would balance the historical impor-
tance of that function against the deterrence value of the exclUSionary 
rule if the petitioner were permitted to invoke it in this context.8 4 The 
Court of Appeals had said: U Against the interest of unencumbered 
80. 18 U.S.r.. § 2514 \1968\. 
81 "'ED. R .. r.RIM. P. 41(el. ,. 
82. In re Calandra. ~2 F. Supp. 7:17. 742 I flo. I). Ohlll 19711. 
q,'3. United StateR \. (,alandra. 465 fo' :!d 1211'1 it,th Cit. 1972',. 
84. 414 U.S. :338. 347 (\9741. 
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inquiry and the efficient administration of justice must be weighed the 
importance which society attaches to the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment guarantee of privacy which is afforded by access to the 
exclusionary rule and Rule 41(e)."s 5 
The Court refused to impede the grand jury's functioning by making 
what it called an "unprecedented extension"s 6 of the exclusionary rule 
to its proceedings. Such an extension, however, is not without prece-
dent. Both the district court and the Court of Appeals concluded that, 
although the law on the precise question was unsettled,s 7 the better 
authority favored the extension of the rule.8 8 
Calandra, of course, was not interested in deterring future police 
misconduct. He sought to mitigate the immediate effect on him of a 
past invasion of his rights. Justice Powell could offer him no comfort: 
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the 
injury to the privacy of the search victim: "[T]he ruptured 
privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. 
Reparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 
637 (1965). Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future 
unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee 
of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and 
seizures: "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its 
purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional 
guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the 
incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 
217 '(1960). Accord, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,656 (1961); 
Tehan v. United States, ex rei. Shott, 382 U.S. 406,416 (1966); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In sum, the rule is a judicially 
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a per-
sonal constitutional-right of the party aggrieved. 8 9 
The cases cited in that passage do not support the conclusion that 
the rule is no more than a judicially created remedy designed to deter 
police misconduct, and not a personal constitutional right. In fact, the 
very precedents the Court relies appear to compel the opposite conclu-
sion. 
True, Elkins v. United States90 does contain the language quoted. 
85. 465 F.2d 1218, 1225-26 (6th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added). 
86. 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). 
87. 332 F. Supp. 737, 738 (N. D_ Ohio 1971). 
88. Cited in support of this position were In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir_ 1971), affd, 408 
U.S. 41 (1972); In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971), een. denied, 408 U.S. 
930 (1972); United States v. Gelbard, 443 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1971) rev'd, 408 U.S. 41 
(1972); Centracchio v, Garrity, 198 F.2d 382 (lst Cir. 1952); In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d 
Cir. 1947). 
89. 414 U.S. at 347-48 (emphasis'added). 
90. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
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But Elkins was decided a year before Mapp had overruled the portion 
of Wolf v. Co lorado 9 1 that declared that the exclusionary rule was not 
an "essential ingredient" of the Fourth Amendment right.92 The Wolf 
Court defined the rule as a deterrent remedy in order to justify its 
refusal to make it binding on the states. When Elkins was decided, Wolf 
was still good law. It no longer is today. The Elkins Court in 1960 quite 
properly relied on it; for the Calandra Court in 1974 to do the same, 
even indirectly, is to reflect inaccurately the present state of the law. 
Furthennore, even though it followed the pre-Mapp law, Elkins, which 
abrogated the "silver platter" doctrine,93 did not define deterrence as 
the sole basis for exclusion. The fundamental justification for the rule, 
it said, was "the imperative of judicial integrity.,,9 4 
Mapp, on the page cited by Justice Powell, did acknowledge Elkins' 
recognition of a deterrent purpose for the rule. The theme of the 
paragraph containing that acknowledgement, however, was reaffmna-
tion of the moral imperative stated in the earlier case: "The criminal 
goes f~ee, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can 
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own 
laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."9 5 
Justice Powell cited Terry v. Ohio96 as being in accord with the 
proposition that deterrence is the "prime purpose" of the exclusionary 
rule.97 The only statement to which he could have referred, on the 
page cited, is this: "The entire deterrent purpose of the rule excluding 
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment rests on the 
assumption that 'limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit 
the quest itself.' ,,98 
But "the entire deterrent purpose" is not at all the same as "deter-
rence, the entire purpose." Terry does, of course, like Elkins and Mapp, 
recognize a deterrent purpose incident to the exclusionary rule, but the 
conclusion that deterrence is the prime purpose of the rule cannot 
stand· against even a cursory reading. While imposing limits on the 
application of the rule, Terry reiterated the need to keep the judicial 
system free from apparent partnership in illegal activity by law-enforce-
ment officers: "Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and 
91. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
92. [d. at 29. 
93. This was a policy under which the Court permitted in federal courts evidence seized by 
state officers (who were not then under any constitutional restrictions on searches and 
seizures), which would have been inadmissible under Weeks if seized by federal officers. 
Elkins decided that since Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), had held that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition applied to the states, the "silver platter doctrine" was no longer 
constitutionally viable. 
94. 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). 
95. 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961). 
96. 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968). 
97. Note 89 supra. 
98. 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968). 
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will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights 
of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of 
such invasions."9 9 
The two other cases Justice Powell cited in support of his· assertion 
that the "prime purpose" of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, Link-
letter v. Walkeri 00 and Tehan v. United States, ex reI. Shott, 1 0 1 are 
both cases in which the issue was retroactive application of a newly 
announced constitutional standard. 
Linkletter laid out three criteria for determining when newly decided 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will be applied in review of 
cases tried before the rules were formulated: (1) the purpose served by 
the new rules; (2) the extent of law enforcement officials' justifiable 
reliance on prior standards; and (3) the effect on the administration of 
justice of retroactive enforcement. 
In applying these criteria the Court stressed the deterrent function of 
the rule, not as a rationale for its imposition, but in a context of 
determining what benefits and burdens might accrue from back-dating 
its application. 1 0 2 Linkletter and Tehan were not saying, "What is the 
reason for the rule?" but, "What is the purpose to be served by 
applying it after the fact?" In this context deterrence and reparation 
are the important factors to consider, since protection of the Fourth 
Amendment guarantee cannot be instituted retroactively. 
Within this framework, both Linkletter and Tehan decided that the 
harm that had been done by constitutional violations antedating the 
case at hand could not be undone; that the violations in question had 
not been such as tended to contaminate the truth-finding function of 
the defendants' trials; and that the benefit the injured individuals might 
derive from retrospective purification of police procedures would be 
outweighed by the detrimental effect on society of, for example, 
releasing numerous defendants, properly adjudged guilty and under 
long sentence, for whom retrial would be difficult. 
To say that the rule's deterrent purpose would not be served by 
retroactive application, after the wrong was long since complete and 
trial had been had under rules that were valid at the time, is a very' 
much different thing from saying that deterrence was the primary 
rationale for its formulation. 
99. ld. at 12. 
100. 381 U.S. 618 (1965), holding that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), would not be applied 
retroactively. Linkletter states: "Mapp had as its prime purpose the enforcement of the 
Fourth Amendment through the inclusion of the exclusionary rule within its rights." 381 
U.S. at 636. 
101. 382 U.S. 406 (1966), denying retrospective application to Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 
609 (1965). 
102. "Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, not prohibited from 
applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh the merits and demerits in each 
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and 
whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965). 
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The cases cited by Justice Powell, considered in their proper con-
texts, do not lead to the conclusion that "in sum the rule is a judicially 
created remedy ... rather than a personal constitutional right of the 
party aggrieved. "I 03 The "sum" comprises Justice Powell's own ex-
trapolations; it does not represent the total weight of the precedents he 
cites. 
Mapp, building on Weeks and Silverthorne, goes to painstaking 
lengthsl 04 to make clear that. a "personal constitutional right" is 
exactly what the Court, in extending it to the states, found the rule to 
be. If it had not so considered it, there would have been no basis for the 
Mapp decision. The Supreme Court of the United States has no author-
ity to make a mere "judicially created remedy" binding on the state 
courts. The language of Mapp makes its position clear: 
Finally, the Court in [Weeks] clearly stated that use of the 
seized evidence involved a "denial of the constitutional rights of 
the accused." Thus, in the year 1914, in the Weeks case, this 
Court "for the first time" held that "in a federal prosecution 
the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured 
through an illegal search and seizure. " This Court has ever since 
required of federal law officers a strict adherence to that com-
mand which this Court has held to be a clear, specific, and 
constitutionally required-even if judicially implied-deterrent 
safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth Amend-
ment would have been reduced to "a form of words." It meant, 
quite simply, that "conviction by means of unlawful seizures 
and enforced confessions ... should find no sanction in the 
judgments of the courts ... " and that such evidence "shall not 
be used at all." 
There are in the cases of this court some passing references to 
the Weeks rule as being one of evidence. But the plain and 
unequivocal language of Weeks-and its later paraphrase in 
Wolf-to the effect that the Weeks rule is of constitutional 
origin, remains entirely undisturbed} os 
Finally, after detailed examination of the history of the exclusionary 
rule from Weeks through Elkins, the Mapp Court announced its 
holding: 
Today we once again examine Wolf's constitutional documenta-
tion of the right to privacy free from unreasonable state intru-
sion, and, after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to 
close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence 
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic 
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that 
103. 414 u.s. 338, 348 (1974). 
104. 367 u.s. 644, 646-55 (1961). 
105. [d. at 648-49 (1961) (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
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very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained 
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by 
that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.1 06 
Exclusion, then, as announced in Weeks and reiterated in Mapp, 
exists to protect the right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment-the 
right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. It is "part and parcel" of the Fourth Amendment. 1 07 
As Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent in Calandra, deterrence is, 
at best, only a desirable by-product of the exclusionary rule.1 08 The 
aim of the Court in formulating the rule was to seek out a meaningful 
sanction for invasions of Fourth Amendment guarantees. 1 09 The tool, 
however, had to be one capable of judicial, as distinguished from 
administrative, enforcement. 
Bound by this limitation, the Court looked to the logic of the Fourth 
Amendment itself. The mandate dictated its own sanction. The First 
Amendment's command, "Congress shall make no law ... " implies, 
"but if it does, the courts will strike it down." The Sixth Amendment's, 
"[i] n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... " 
implies, "but if he doesn't, the courts will not permit his convic-
tion to stand." The Fifth Amendment's "[n] 0 person ... shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... " says 
clearly, "but if he is, the courts will not hear his testimony." The 
Fourth Amendment treats the right of security against unreasonable 
search and seizure of "persons, houses, papers and effects"-in other 
words, unlawful capture of evidence. The Amendment says this right 
"shall not be violated." The implication appears to be, "[b]ut if it is, 
the courts will not receive the evidence." 
This is what the Court in Mapp implied when it spoke of the 
command of exclusion as being a "clear, specific, and constitutionally 
required-even if judicially implied-deterrent safeguard.,,1 10 "Judi-
cially implied" does not mean "judicially contrived" or "judicially 
manufactured." It means derived by judges construing the language of 
the ~mendment itself, the normal judicial function. And in the phrase 
"deterrent safeguard," the operative word is safeguard. The exclusion-
ary rule is a sanction, a means of preserving a precious right, which, 
because of its nature and the people on whom it operates in its punitive 
aspects-Prosecuting attorneys and police-has an incidental deterrent 
effect. . 
If Congress were to pass a law establishing a state religion, no one 
would ask how frequently this kind of thing happened. No court would 
106. ld. at 654-55 (emphasis added). 
107. ld. at 651. 
108. 414 U;S. at 356. 
109. ld. 
110. Note 105 supra. 
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debate whether the imposition of sanction would deter future Con-
gresses from passing illegal legislation. The statute would fall, because 
the Constitution decrees it. If a defendant were convicted after being 
denied the right to call his witnesses, the question whether reversal 
would deter future courts from lawlessness would not arise. The same 
reasoning makes debate about the incidence of particular kinds of 
police misconduct, and discussion of the deterrent value of imposing 
the exclusionary rule in a given case, non sequitur. 
The present Court, however, does not see the exclusionary rule as 
necessary to the logic of the Bill of Rights. Having set up deterrence as 
the rule's prime justification, Justice Powell then posited effective 
deterrence as the sole criterion for determining whether it should be 
applied in a given case: "As with any remedial device, the application of 
the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives 
are thought most efficaciously served. ,,1 1 1 
In Calandra's case Justice Powell concluded that the goal of deter-
rence would not be served, on the theory that the police would not be 
prompted to conduct illegal searches and seizures to gather evidence for 
presentation to a grand jury, if that evidence would not be admissible at 
a later criminal trial of the one from whom it has been seized. 1 ! 2 
This conclusion does not reflect the reality of investigative strategy. 
The effect is to leave one in Calandra's position without remedy for a 
real violation of his rights, unless he can prove damages.! 1 3 Since he 
has been granted immunity, his claim cannot be vindicated in the 
criminal' process. 1 1 4 The decision in effect says, "Your Fourth Amend-
ment rights are worth nothing unless the government chooses to indict 
you, because in the absence of provable damages, you have no forum in 
which to assert them." 
What this means is that now the government has license, in investigat-
ing organized crime, as here, or the activities of political dissidents, or 
"enemies," to violate with impunity the Fourth Amendment rights of 
those whom it does not seek to prosecute. The incentive, in terms of 
information for "background files" or investigative leads to higher 
organization figures, would be, to some, irresistible. 
In determining that Calandra had standing to claim suppression, the 
Court of Appeals relied on Rule 41(e), Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.! 1 5 Both Jones v. United States! 1 6 and Alderman v. United 
111. 414 U.S. at 348. 
112. Id. at 348-49. 
113. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971), allows recovery of damages from federal agents conducting an illegal search and 
seizure. If the illegal conduct is by state officers, acting under color of state law, an action 
lies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871). 
114. The immunity granted Calandra was transactional. Under the "use immunity" statute, 
18 U.S.C. § § 6002-03 (1970), upheld in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), 
he would be in a worse predicament, because he could still be prosecuted on the basis of 
evidence arrived at independently of his testimony. 
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States' '7 had made plain that the requirement of standing to assert the 
exclusionary rule is given expression in the "person aggrieved" language 
of Rule 41(e). The Court of Appeals decided that Calandra was indeed 
a person aggrieved, and that the rule was broad enough to permit him 
to file a motion under it prior to indictment.' , 8 
Reversing, Justice Powell stated that Rule 41(e) "does not constitute 
a statutory expansion of the exclusionary rule,'" '9 and asserted that 
permitting a suppression motion to be made before indictment would 
constitute such an expansion. Justice Powell cites Brown v. United 
States,' 20 Alderman,' 2' Wong Sun v. United States' :2 2 and Jones' :2 3 
for the proposition that: 
[S] tanding to invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined 
to situations where the Government seeks to use such evidence 
to incriminate the victim of the unlawful search .... This stand-
ing rule is premised on a recognition that the need for deter-
rence and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are 
strongest where the Government's unlawful conduct would re-
sult in imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of the 
search.' 24 
What this assertion seemingly overlooks is that in each of the cases 
cited to support it, the motion to suppress came after indictment. The 
holdings were confined to those in the position of criminal defendant 
because the question of standing was raised by criminal defendants. 
None of the cases cited presented the question found in Calandra-that 
of a person actually aggrieved, in the Jones and Alderman sense,' 2 5 
115. "A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court ... for 
the return of the property and to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained on the 
ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is 
insufficient on its face, or (3) the property seized is not that described in the warrant, or 
(4) there was not probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the 
warrant was issued, or (5) the warrant was illegally executed. The judge shall receive 
evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is 
granted the property shall be restored unless"otherwise subject to lawful detention and it 
shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. ... The motion shall be made 
before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefore did not exist or the defendant was not 
aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the 
motion at the trial or hearing." 
116. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
117. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
118. United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218, 1223, (6th Cir. 1972). 
119. 414 U.S. at 337-38 n.6. 
120. 411 U.S. 223 (1973). 
121. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
122. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
123. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
124. 414 U:S. 338, 348 (1974) (citations omitted). 
125. "In order"to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure' one must 
hav"e been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as 
distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as 
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who knows in advance of indictment that a grand jury is basing a part 
of its investigation on evidence illegally seized from him, and who 
moves at that stage for suppression of both the evidence and its use as 
the basis for questioning. 
No previous standing case holds that only a criminal defendant may 
invoke the exclusionary rule. Such a holding, indeed, would be contrary 
. not only to the promise of the Fourth Amendment, that the rights it 
protects "shall not be violated," but also to the rule of Weeks: "[T] his 
remedy reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty 
of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under 
our federal system with the enforcement of the laws.,,116 Justice 
Holmes in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States1 1 7 took this 
language to mean that illegally seized evidence could not be laid before 
the grand jury. 
A general test for determining standing was stated in Association of 
Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp: 1 2 II 
[I] t concerns, apart from the "case" or "controversy" test, the 
question whether the interest sought to be protected by the 
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be 
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guar-
antee in question.1 29 
If we assume that the "zone of interests" to be protected here is the 
Fourth Amendment guarantee, then, since Calandra's rights were vio-
lated by the search itself, clearly Calandra had standing. Only if we 
assume that the "zone of interest" is nothing more than the deterrence 
of future unlawful police conduct can any question arise. Even then, 
the fact that he would otherwise be without a remedy would seem 
enough to tip the balance in his favor. 
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is, as stated in Weeks and 
Mapp, to preserve Fourth Amendment rights, then in deciding whether 
to apply the rule in a particular case, logic would dictate that we look 
to the purpose of the Amendment-which is not to protect the right of 
the criminal defendant, as Justice Powell's position assumes, but to 
protect the right of the people. "[I]t is only fair ~o observe that the 
real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search it-
self .... "130 Therefore, anyone whose rights are violated by an un-
reasonable search or seizure should have standing to invoke the exclu-
sionary rule, whenever he becomes aware of the violation. 
The Calandra decision does not directly impair the earlier standing 
a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else." Jones v. United States, 
362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). 
126. 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914) (emphasis added). 
127. 251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920). 
128. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
129. Id. at 153. 
130. U.S. v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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cases. They are inapposite to the situation presented here, and the 
holdings still stand when applied to the facts that they cover. The same 
is not true of Justice Powell's treatment of Silverthorne,1 3 1 the pro-
genitor of the "fmit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. There is reason to 
agree with Justice Brennan: "Only if Silverthorne is overruled can its 
precedent force to compel affirmance here be denied."l 3 2 
Silverthorne held that a grand jury must be denied access to illegally 
seized records, books and papers.1 33 Pursuant to the Silverthornes' 
motion to suppress these materials, the district court ordered return of 
the originals, impounding photographs and copies of them. After re-
turning the originals, the grand jury tried to recover them by issuing a 
subpoena duces tecum. When the Silverthornes refused to comply, the 
corporation was adjudged in contempt.1 34 In reversing the conviction, 
the Court, through Justice Holmes, said: 
. The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that 
although of course its seizure was an outrage which the Govern-
ment now regrets, it may study the papers before it returns 
them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge that it has 
gained to call upon the owners in a more regular form to 
produce them; that the protection of the Constitution covers 
the physical possession but not any advantages that the Govern-
ment can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the 
forbidden act .. ' .. In our opinion such is not the law. It reduces 
the Fourth Amendment to a form of words .... The essence of 
a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain 
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used 
before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.1 3 5 
Calandra, like the Silverthornes, sought to avoid furnishing the grand 
jury with evidence that he would not have been called on to supply had 
it not been for the illegal search and seizure. Justice Powell distin-
guished Silverthorne first on the ground that the plaintiffs-in-error had 
been indicted and could therefore invoke the exclusionary rule by 
virtue of their being criminal defendants.1 36 Moreover, he continued, 
the government's interest in Silverthorne in recapturing the original 
documents was: 
... founded on a belief that they might be useful in the 
criminal prosecution already authorized by the grand jury. It 
131. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
132. 414 U.S. 338, 362-63 (1974) (dissenting opinion). 
133. The Silverthornes, father and son, indicted on a single, specific charge. were arrested and 
detained for several hours. During that time federal agents, without a warrant, went to 
their office and "made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and documents found there." 
251 U.S. at 390. Mter making photographs and copies of the material. the district 
attorney then presented it to the grand jury that had returned the original indictment, 
and a 'new indictment was framed. 
134. Although the lumber company was a corporation, it was. under the rule of Hale v. Henkel. 
201 U.S. 43 (1906), in the same position as Calandra with respect to self-incrimination. 
135. 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920) (citations omitted). 
136. 414 U.S. 338, 352 n.8 (1974). 
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did not appear that the grand jury needed the documents to 
perform its investigative or accusatorial functions. Thus, the 
primary consequence of the Court's decision was to exclude the 
evidence from the subsequent criminal trial.) 3 7 
But if the grand jury did not need the documents to perform its 
investigative or accusatorial functions, why did it need them? What 
other need would a grand jury have for evidence that "might be useful" 
in a criminal prosecution it had already authorized? The only logical 
reason for the grand jury's wanting the material was to gain information 
for further criminal charges. 
The final ground cited by Justice Powell for distinguishing the two 
cases is that in Silverthorne there had been a judicial determination 
before the issuance of the subpoena that the search and seizure was 
illegal, so it was not necessary to interrupt the grand jury proceedings 
pending decision of a pre-indictment motion to suppress.) 38 That 
judicial determination, however, came on a motion filed during earlier 
grand jury proceedings, in the course of which the documents were 
ordered returned. Justice Powell raises no question about the interrup-
tion of that proceeding, which seems to weaken somewhat his basis for 
distinction. 
Silverthorne's pronouncement that illegally seized evidence "shall 
not be used at all," Justice Powell dismissed as "broad dictum."1 3 9 It 
has, he said, been substantially undermined by later decisions, chiefly 
the standing cases cited earlier ,I 40 among which Calandra will now be 
numbered. 
MICHIGAN V. TUCKER 
In Michigan v. Tuckerl 4 I the Court, speaking this time through 
Justice Rehnquist, built on Harris and Calandra to further restrict 
137. Id. 
138. Justice Powell put great stress on the fact that interruption for adjudication of 
suppression motions in advance of indictment would result in a series of "mini-trials," 
which would unduly delay the grand jury proceedings, possibly frustrating important 
investigations. The district court had considered this argument too, and Judge Battisti 
"respectfully rejected" it in eloquent terms: 
The (erm delay means that time during which a case is allowed to lie unresolved 
when there is no justifiable reason not to dispose of the lawsuit. Delay means 
unavoidable delay .... Time properly consumed in the trial of a complex case, or 
analyses of complex or difficult issues, or in holding a hearing to examine whether 
one's constitutionally protected rights have been violated is not delay, as that term 
is used in the context of the courts .... The judicial system is designed to protect 
the Bill of Rights, not to cast it aside in a mad rush toward the goal of judicial 
efficiency. Any examination of a potential infringement of those rights can, under 
no circumstances, be considered avoidable delay. In re Calandra. 332 F. Supp. 737, 
741 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
139. 414 U.S. 338, 352 n.8 (1974). 
140. Id. at 348. 
141. _U.S.~ 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974). 
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Miranda's exclusionary rule and to seriously erode "the fruit of the 
poisonous tree" as courts since Wong Sun and Miranda have understood 
the doctrine. 
One morning in April 1966 a woman in Pontiac, Michigan, failed to 
report to her job. A friend and co-worker, alarmed when she did not 
answer her telephone, went to her house and found her, bound and 
gagged and partly undressed. She had been raped and severely beaten. 
Throughout the course of the trial and the appeals she was unable to 
recall what had happened to her. 
When her friend arrived, he found a dog inside the victim's house, 
although she did not own one. Later, while talking to police, he saw 
what he thought was the saltle dog. Police followed it to Tucker's 
house, where it sat down in the front yard; neighbors reported that the 
dog was Tucker's. Tucker was arrested and taken to the sheriff's office, 
where officers noticed scratches on his face and blood on his under-
wear. Tucker explained that the scratches had been caused by the 
flailing of a goose he and his friend Henderson had shot,) 42 but the 
blood on his underwear proved to be human. 
Before interrogation began, Tucker, like Harris, was given warnings 
that were sufficient under Escobedo v. Illinois,) 4 3 but was not, how-
ever, told that an attorney would be appointed if he could not afford to 
hire one.1 44 
In the course of questioning, Tucker said that he had been with 
Henderson during the general time when the crime occurred. Inter-
viewed by the police, Henderson gave information incriminating 
Tucker.1 4 5 Tucker's appointed attorney moved in advance of trial for 
suppression of Henderson's expected testimony on the ground that it 
was the fruit of the illegal interrogation. The prosecution stipulated 
that the witness' identity had been learned only through the police 
questioning. Although the trial court excluded Tucker's own statement, 
it allowed the prosecution to introduce Henderson's testimony. Tucker 
was convicted and sentenced to twenty to forty years' imprisonment. 
Following affirmation by the Court of Appeals) 46 and the Supreme 
Court of Michigan,14 7 he petitioned for habeas corpus in the federal 
142. Tucker v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
143. 378 U.S. 478 (1963). 
144. Tucker did not ask for a lawyer, and did not assert denial of the right to counsel, thus 
Escobedo did not govern here. The Miranda decision was not announced for another two 
months, but since trial was held after that time, as in Harris, Miranda applied under the 
rule of Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
145. Henderson said that although he had seen Tucker on the date in question, Tucker had left 
him rather early in the evening. The scratches on Tucker's face had been there when 
Tucker arrived at Henderson's house on the following day. Henderson had asked Tucker 
"if he got hold of a wild one or something." Tucker replied, "Something like that," and 
when 'asked who she was, answered, "Some woman lived the next block over-a widow 
woman." _U.S.-. 94 S. Ct. at 2360. 
146. PeOple v. Tucker, 19 \1ich.App. 320,172 N.W.2d 712 (1969). 
147. 385 Mich. 594, 189 N.W.2d 290 (1971). 
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district court. "Reluctantly," the district court granted the writ. I 4 8 
Relying on Silverthorne, Wong Sun and Gilbert, the court said: "[I]t is 
clear that testimony of third parties which is obtained as the result of a 
violation of Sixth Amendment rights of the accused cannot be intro-
duced against the accused at trial.,,1 4 9 The Court of Appeals approved 
without opinion.) 50 
Narrow grounds for reversal were argued by the State of Michi-
gan I 5) and accepted by two concurring Justices, Brennan and Marshall. 
They urged that Johnson v. New Jersey I 52 be modified by adoption of 
an "activity date," as opposed to Johnson's "trial date," rule concern-
ing the retroactive effect of Miranda. That is, the date of interrogation, 
rather than the date of the trial, should be the one used to determine 
whether Miranda applied in a given case. I 53 Justice Bre~nan reasoned 
that the adoption of such a policy was particularly appropriate when 
. admissibility of fruits of interrqgation was at issue, as opposed to 
admissibility of a direct statement, because the element of unreliability 
)s less important in such a case. I 54 
The case could also have been decided on the narrow basis that the 
"poisonous tree" doctrine should not apply to the testimony of a live 
witness, provided the witness himself is available for cross-examination. 
This ground, also urged by the state, I 5 5 would have been consistent 
with two cases decided by Chief Justice Burger when he was a Court of 
Appeals judge. I 56 Such a result could have been justified in a case like 
148. Tucker v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
149. Id. at 269. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court said that the trial 
testimony that the witnesses had identified the defendant at the pre· trial lineup had to be 
excluded since the lineup itself was illegal: "Thai testimony was the direct result of the 
illegal line-up, 'come at by exploitation of [the primary) illegality.' [Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) )." 
150. 480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1973). 
151. Brief for Petitioner at 8-10, Michigan v. Tucker, _ U.S. ~ 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974). The 
State also argued that Miranda should be overruled and the "all attendant circum-
stances" test of voluntariness reinstated. 
152. 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
153. Such an approach would be consistent with Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967);which 
held that the rule of Wade and Gilbert would apply only to confrontations that took place 
after the date of decision; with Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), which held 
that the standards set forth in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), would apply 
only to wiretaps made after the decision date; and with Williams v. United States, 401 
U.S. 646 (1971), which held that the Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), standards 
would apply only to searches conducted after the decision date. In addition, Jenkins v. 
Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969), had held that the Miranda rules would not apply to 
retrials of persons whose original trial had begun prior to Miranda, which is not 
inconsistent with an "activity" rationale. 
154. _ U.S. _, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2371 (1974) (concurring opinion). 
155. Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Michigan v. Tucker, _U.S.~ 94·S. Ct. 2357 (1974). 
156. In Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963), police learned the name of an 
eyewitness through illegal interrogation of the defendant. Then Judge Burger wrote: 
Here no confessions or utterances of the appellants were used against them; 
tangible evidence obtained from appellants, such as the victim's watch, was 
suppressed along with the confessions. But a witness is not an inanimate object 
which like contraband narcotics, a pistol or stolen goods, "speak for themselves." 
The proffer of a living witness is not to be mechanically equated with the proffer of 
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Tucker's, where the name of the witness was furnished as an alibi. The 
police were bound to interview Henderson, to learn whether he would 
in fact exculpate the defendant. An argument could be made that since 
the state had an obligation to seek his testimony, it should not be 
barred from using it. 
The majority, however, rejected these bases for decision, which 
would have left Miranda intact. Instead, the Court reached out to work 
substantial changes in the Miranda doctrine. Tucker declares: 
(1) Police interrogation of a suspect without giving him the full 
Miranda warnings does not deprive him of his privilege against self-
incrimination as such, but only fails "to make available to him the full 
measure of procedural safeguards associated with that right since 
Miranda. ". 5 7 
(2) Therefore, since -there has been no "actual infringement" of the 
defendant's constitutional rights, Wong Sun does not apply. This leaves 
the Court, in the absence of controlling precedent, free to "examine the 
matter as a question of principle.'" 5 8 Miranda, said the Court, does 
not reach the question of fruits.' 5 9 
(3) As a matter of principle, since no deterrent purpose would be 
served by excluding the testimony of a live witness whose identity was 
learned through an interrogation conducted in good-faith omission of a 
procedural safeguard, that witness' testimony will be admitted. The 
opinion does not state whether its rule would apply if the defendant's 
statement had led them to physical evidence of equal reliability. The 
logic of the decision does not seem to bar such a conclusion. 
Tucker explicitly extends the deterrence rationale for exclusion to a 
self-incrimination setting} 60 It then reiterates Calandra's assumption 
that the rule is properly applied only when its deterrent purpose would 
be served: 
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily as-
sumes that the police have engaged' in willful, or at the very 
least, negligent conduct which has deprived the defendant of 
some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of 
inanimate evidentiary objects illegally seized. The fact that the name of a 
potential witness is disclosed to police is of no evidentiary significance, per se,since 
the living witness is an individual human personality whose attributes of will, 
perception, memory and volition interact to determine what testimony he will 
give. [d. at 88l. 
Similarly, concurring in Brown v. United States, 375 F.2d 310 (D.C.Cir. 1967), he wrote: 
The critical aspect of Smith-Bowden is that live witnesses are not "sup-
pressed," as inanimate objects may be. When an eyewitness is willing to give 
testimony, under oath and subject to all the rigors of cross-examination and penal-
ties of perjury, he must be heard. How he came to be in court is a matter which 
goes only to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony. [d. at 319. 
157. _ U.S. ~ 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2364 (1974). 
158. [d. 
159. [d. at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2368 n.26. 
160. Harris extended it implicitly. 
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such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular 
investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater 
degree of care towards the right of an accused. Where the 
official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the 
deterrence rationale loses much of its force. 1 6 1 
117 
Justice Rehnquist considers it sufficient that, in accordance with 
Miranda and Johnson, the defendant's own statements were excluded at 
trial. Evidence derived from those statements is not barred, because to 
do so would not further the goal of deterrence.1 62 
If any person is compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against 
himself-as Miranda held he is when interrogation is conducted absent 
the prescribed warnings and required waiver--exclusion of his testimony 
is not optional. The Fifth Amendment is an exclusionary rule. 1 6 3 
Though many different reasons have been advanced to explain the 
historical basis of the privilege,. 64 and it has been subject periodically 
to attack,. 6 5 it is beyond question that unless a defendant is insulated 
from any criminal penalties, the government may not use his compelled 
testimony to prove its case against him .16 6 Exclusion in a Fifth 
Amendment context is not to deter future misconduct, but to carry out 
the express tenns of the Amendment. 
Tucker had argued that the testimony should be excluded on the 
ground that the adversary system requires "the government in its 
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load."1 6 7 This 
161. _ U.S. ~ 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2365 (1974). Justice Rehnquist cited Calandra for the 
proposition that the exclusionary rule's "prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police 
conduct," Id. at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2365, and stated that Calandra "relied upon" (in addition 
to Elkins) Mapp, Tehan and Terry. Id. at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2365, n.20. He then continued, 
"In a proper case this rationale would seem applicable to the Fifth Amendment context as 
well." _ U.S. at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2365 (emphasis added). 
162. "Whatever deterrent effect on future police conduct the exclusion of those statements 
may have had, we do not believe it would be significantly augmented by excluding the 
testimony of the witness Henderson as well." _ U.S. at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2366 (1974). 
163. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring), "But I think 
that words taken from his lips ... are ... inadmissible provided they are taken from him 
without his consent. They are inadmissible because of the command of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
"'That is an unequivocal, defmite and workable rule of evidence for state and federal 
courts." Id. at 179. 
164. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 
378 U.S. 52, 55-57 n.5 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961); Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. ·616 (1886); United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 566, 579, 
581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), reu'd 353 U.S. 391 (1957). 
165. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Friendly, J., The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: 
The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968). See also Twining v. 
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
166. See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 652 (1892), the privilege must be "as 
broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard." 
See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 
378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 
(1896). 
167. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961) quoted by the court, _ U.S. at 
~ 94 S. Ct. at 2366. 
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interpretation of the basis of the privilege Justice Rehnquist defined as 
a "suggested basis for the exclusionary rule in Fifth Amendment 
cases. 1 6 8 He discredits Wigmore's rationale by saying that to the extent 
that it "may exist independently of the deterrence and trustworthiness 
rationales,"1 6 9 it is of no help to Tucker, since "the government is not 
forbidden all resort to the defendant to make out its case.,,170 To 
support this statement Justice Rehnquist cited Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia l 7 1 and United States v. Dionisio. 1 72 Neither of these cases has 
any bearing, however, on Tucker's situation, since both dealt expressly 
with the compelled production of non testimonial evidence, which the 
Court held was not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
The Fifth Amendment requires exclusion of evidence produced in 
violation of the privilege it confers. Miranda held that the privilege is 
violated by custodial interrogation that does not comply fully with its 
requirement of warnings and waiver. The interrogation in Tucker did 
not meet the Miranda requirement. Hence it would seem that under the 
principles of Silverthorne and Wong Sun, evidence derived from that 
interrogation must be excluded, unless Miranda does not apply; 73 or 
an exception is made to it; 74 or Miranda is overruled. Justice 
Rehnquist rejected all three of these options. Instead, he distorted the 
controlling precedent to conclude that interrogation without the full 
Miranda warnings did not violate Tucker's Fifth Amendment rights: 
The Court [in Miranda] recognized that these procedural 
safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Consti-
tution but were instead measures to insure that the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination was protected. As the Court re-
marked: '[W] e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily 
requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent 
compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently con-
ducted.' The suggested safeguards were not intended to "create 
a constitutional straightjacket," but rather to provide practical 
reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion.1 75 
The actual passage cited in Miranda does not carry the meaning 
Justice Rehnquist found in it. What Miranda said was that the warnings 
and waiver that it demanded to pro~ct the Fifth Amendment privilege 
were not the only possible safeguards that could be devised to suit the 
purpose. The states were encouraged to work out alternative solutions 
168. _ U.S. at---. 94 S. Ct. at 2366 (emphasis added). 
169. [d. at ---. 94 S. Ct. at 2366-67. 
170. [d. at ---. 94 S. Ct. at 2367. 
171. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
172. 410 U.S. 1 (1973). 
173. For example, it would not apply under the suggested "activity date" rationale. 
174. An example is, by excepting the testimony of an alibi witness. 
175. ~ U.S. ---. 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2364 (1974) (citations omitted). 
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to arrive at the same result, but until they did, the procedure laid out in 
Miranda was constitutionally mandatory. 1 76 The State of Michigan had 
made no showing of any effort to develop alternative procedures to 
cover the full scope of the Miranda requirement. Its officers had simply 
omitted an element of the" necessary warnings. 
The conclusion that the omission of the required warnings was not a 
violation of a constitutional right, but only a deprivation of a proce-
dural safeguard conflicts with express language in Miranda: "The re-
quirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with 
respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary 
ritual to existing methods of interrogation[,]"1 77 :md: "In each in-
stance [of the four cases decided iIi Miranda], we have concluded that 
statements were obtained from the defendant under circumstances that 
did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privi-
lege.,,1 78 If the Miranda Court had not considered the warning and 
waiver requirement of constitutional dimension, of course, it would 
have been constitutionally prohibited from applying it to the states. 
This facet of federalism the Court ignored in Tucker as it did in 
Calandra. 
In further support of the contention that the defendant was not 
deprived of any constitutional right, Justice Rehnquist asserted that 
since Tucker said he did not want a lawyer, his statement "could hardly 
be termed involuntary as that term has been defined in the decisions of 
this COurt.;'1 79 He was "simply not exposed to 'the cruel trilemma of 
self-accUsation, perjury, or contempt.' "1 80 
One purpose of Miranda, however, was to end the confusion and 
uncertainty fostered by the long-standing policy of case-by-case ad-
176. It is impossible for us to see the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege 
which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative 
rule· making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily 
requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the 
interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a 
constitutional straitjacket which will handicap efforts at reform, nor is it intended 
to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their 
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the 
individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, 
unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising 
accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity 
to exercise it, the following procedures must be observed. 384 U.S. 436, 467 
(1966). (emphasis added). 
177. ld. at 476. 
178. ld. at 491 (emphasis added). 
179. _ U.S. at __ 94 S. Ct. at 2364. 
180. ld. at __ 94 S. Ct. at 2364, quoting Murphyv. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
181. For thirty years after Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), holding inadmissible a 
confession obtained by state officers who beat a suspect with ropes and studded belts, the 
Court attempted, by" considering the "totality of the circumstances," to determine 
whether a particular confession was voluntary or coerced. Frankfurter, J., discusses the 
"ultimate test" of voluntariness in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 570-602 
(1961). See also Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935,973-82 
(1966). 
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judication of voluntariness.' 8' Instead, per se exclusion was to follow 
omission of the necessary warnings and failure to get a knowing, 
intelligent waiver of the right they were instituted to protect. The 
"voluntariness" test was expressly rejected.' 8 2 Tucker appears to rein-
state it. 
Apparently, under Tucker, if a defendant's statement can be con-
sidered voluntary by the "cruel trilemma" test, his constitutional rights 
are not violated by incomplete Miranda warnings. Then, provided the 
omission was inadvertent and neither willful nor negligent, only his 
statements themselves are barred. Evidence derived from them is ad-
missible. This may be true whether such evidence is physical or testi-
monial. 
The court said in Miranda that statements taken in violation of 
the Miranda principles must not be used to prove the prosecu-
tion's case at trial. That requirement was fully complied with by 
the state court here: respondent's statements, claiming that he 
was with Henderson and then asleep during the time period of 
the crime were not admitted against him at trial.' 83 
Building on this Court's own fragile precedent, Justice Rehnquist 
cites Harris as authority that a failure to give an interrogated suspect 
.full Miranda warnings does not compel exclusion of his statements in 
every conceivable situation.' 84 Harris' conclusion that it does not 
follow from Miranda that all evidence inadmissible in the case in chief is 
barred for all purposes, provided its trustworthiness satisfies legal stand-
ards, says Justice Rehnquist, "is equally applicable here;'" 85 
Tucker's assertion that Miranda requires exclusion only of the de-
fendant's statements, and not of their fruits, conflicts with the language 
of that case-language that under the Harris standard must be con-
sidered "controlling," since it appeared in the Court's summary of its 
holding: 
After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity 
afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently 
waive these rights arid agree to answer questions or make a 
statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are 
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained 
as a result of interrogation can be used against him.' 8 6 
Two of the dissenters in Miranda took "no evidence" to apply to 
182. "In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in 
traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth 
Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest .... To be sure, the records do 
not evince overt physical coercion or patent psychological ploys. The fact remains that in 
none of these cases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the 
outset of the interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free 
choice." 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966). . 
183. _ U.S. ~ 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2364 (1974). 
184. Id. "at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2367. The situation here, however, is not similar to that in Harris. 
185. Id. at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2367~. 
186. 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (emphasis added). 
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fruits as well as to direct statements. 1 87 Justice Brennan, also a 
member of the Miranda Court, stated that his concurrence in the result 
in Tucker (on the basis of an "activity date" modification of Johnson) 
rests on the assumption that Miranda requires the exclusion of fruits in 
order to give full effect to the "no evidence" language of the hold-
ing. 1 8 8 Justice Rehnquist disposed of this argument by flat contradic-
tion. Modification of Johnson, he stated, would not solve the problems 
of this case. Johnson is not controlling on fruits, for the reason that the 
parent decision, Miranda, did not reach the question of fruits. 1 89 
Miranda held that police failure to comply with its requirements 
violated the Fifth Amendment privilege. That being so, the Court could 
hardly have felt it necessary to spell out that it meant the decision to 
apply to fruits of a coerced confession as well as to the confession 
itself. A long line of cases, beginning with Counselman in 1892, had 
held that a violation of the self-incrimination clause barred not only 
direct but derivative use of the defendant's testimony. 1 90 
Kastigar v. United States, 1 91 a decision of the present Court, recog-
nized "that derivative use is prohibited even when the fruit is the 
testimony of a live witness. Stating that :'use-derivative use" immunity 
is consistent with the conceptual basis of Counselman, the Court cited 
that case's condemnation of an immunity statute without a "derivative 
use" provision on the ground: 
that it could not prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses 
and evidence which should be attributable directly to the testi-
mony he might give under compulsion, and on which he might 
be convicted, when otherwise, and if he had refused to answer, 
he could not possibly have been convicted. 1 9 2 
Miranda offered strong incentive to police and prosecutors to conwly 
with its terms. If the state could establish that the required warnings 
187. Justice Clark wrote, "The court further holds that failure to follow the new procedures 
requires inexorably the exclusion of any statement by the accused, as well as the fruits 
thereof." 384 U.S. at 500 (emphliSis added). And Justice White said: "Today's decision 
leaves open such questions as whether the accused was in custody, whether his 
statements were spontaneous or the product of interrogation, whether the accused has 
effectively waived his rights, and whether nontestimonial evidence introduced at trial is 
the fruit of statements made during a prohibited interrogation, all of which are certain to 
prove productive of uncertainty during investigation and litigation during prosecution." 
384 U.S. at 545 (emphasis added). In concurring in the Tucker decision, however, Justice 
White said Mironda did not deal with the testimony of third persons. _ U.S. at ---. 94 S. 
Ct. at 2372. 
188. _U.S. ---. 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2372 n.5. For interpretations that "evidence obtained as a 
result" does not include derivative evidence, see H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 279 (1967); 35 
FORDHAM L. REV. 169, 193 (1966). 
189. _ U.S. at ---.94 S. Ct. at 2364 n.26. 
190. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). "The privilege afforded not 
only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction ... but likewise 
embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to 
prosecute .... " Henderson's testimony falls clearly within this definition. 
191. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
192. [d. at 454, citing 142 U.S. 547, 564 (1892) (emphasis added). 
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had been given, and the necessary waiver obtained, it virtually assured 
the admissibility of any statement the defendant made, so long as the 
police conduct had not been so grossly coercive as to violate due 
process.1 9 3 The combined holdings of Tucker and Harris seem to 
remove any incentive to more than ritualistic adherence to Miranda. 
If an element of the warnings is omitted, or the warnings are given 
and a voluntary waiver not obtained, the defendant's statement itself, 
under Harris, may be used to impeach any testimony he offers at trial. 
Now, in addition, if the state can meet the elusive requirement of 
showing that any deficiency under Miranda was inadvertent and not 
willful, l 94 evidence derived from that statement is admissible in the 
prosecution's case in chief. If, as Justice Rehnquist concludes, Miranda 
does not reach the question of fruits, there would seem to be no logical 
necessity to limit Tucker's holding to live testimony. If that is so-if the 
state may make full use of the defendent's statement to gather leads to 
whatever corroborative evidence it needs-then loss of the statement 
itself as direct evidence would, in most cases, be no loss at all. The 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" would seem to have lost most of its 
vitality in self-incrimination cases. Moreover, obedience to Miranda 
appears to be reduced almost to a discretionary matter of investigative 
strategy. 
Justice Rehnquist justified the Tucker holding as a balance of in-
terests. On the one side he placed society's interest in "making available 
to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence," 
and its interest in the "effective prosecution of criminals." On the 
other, he placed the "need to provide an effective sanction to a 
constitutional right."l 9 5 
THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE 
Abandonment of the exclusionary rule has much reasoned sup-
port.1 96 The means the present Court has chosen to achieve it, how-
ever, leave much to be desired. The process of attrition of the rule, 
rather than overruling it, breeds uncertainty as to what the law is. In 
pursuing its policy of gradual withdrawal, the Court has made hairline 
distinctions and novel interpretations of earlier cases. It has then built 
193. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
194. Actually, Tucker does not state where the burden of proof of willfulness or negligence lies. 
195. _ U.S. at -> 94 S. Ct. at 2366. 
196. E.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1934); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 
N.E. 585 (1926); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 214& (McNaughton rev. 1961); Little, The 
Exclusionary Rule of Evidence as a Means of Enforcing the Fourth Amendment Morality 
on Police, 3 IND. L.F. 375 (19~0); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and 
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970); Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of 
Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785 (1970); Bums, Mapp v. Ohio: An 
All American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 80 (1969); Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 
54 MICH. L. REV. 679 (1944). 
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on its own short string of precedents to create the impression that the 
law has always been what the Court now says it is. 
Moreover, the decisions of this Court tend to overlook or dismiss the 
distinct imperatives enunciated in the earlier cases. I 9 7 This Court 
apparently thinks in terms of practical goals, weighing principle accord-
ing to whether it furthers them. In both Tucker and Calandra, for 
instance, the Court makes clear that in its view the application of the 
exclusionary rule depends wholly on whether its invocation in a par-
ticular type of proceeding will significantly further the goal of deter-
rence of unlawful police conduct. It treats deterrence as the sole 
rationale for the rule, ignoring the other bases explicitly stated in prior 
cases: the constitutional mandate;' 98 the imperative of judicial integ-
rity;1 99 and the facilitation of the fair administration of justice.2 0 0 
Apparently this Court does not agree that it "is a less evil that some 
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an 
ignoble part."2 0 I 
A focus on results, particularly when they promote efficient law 
enforcement, finds support among some reputable scholars and practi-
tioners, who disparage decisions dealing in philosophical abstrac-
tions.2 02 But even purely pragmatic decisions should depend on careful 
reasoning and honest attention to precedent. They should not be based 
on bald pronouncements that ignore or misread the clear constitutional 
command of earlier cases. The practice of this Court, however, has been 
to distort the meaning of the principal exclusion cases, making them 
appear to say what they do not say-or not to say what they do say. 2 0 3 
197. For instance, in his dissent in Bivens, Chief Justice Burger wrote: "From time to time 
members of the Court ... have articulated varying alternative justifications for the 
suppression of important evidence in a criminal trial. Under one of these alternative 
theories the rule's foundation is shifted to the 'sporting contest' thesis that the 
government must 'play the game fairly' and cannot be allowed to profit from its own 
illegal acts. But the exclusionary rule does not ineluctably flow from a desire to ensure 
that government plays the 'game' according to the rules." 403 U.S. 388, 414 (diasenting 
opinion) (citations omitted). See also Justice Brennan's dissent in Calandro: "For the 
first time, the Court today discounts to the point of extinction the vital function of the 
rule to insure that the judiciary avoids even the slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal 
government conduct. This rejection of 'the imperative of judicial integrity' ... openly 
invites' [t)he conviction that all government is staffed by ... hypocrites. [This conviction 
is) easy to instill and difficult to erase.' .. 414 U.S. at 360. 
198. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
199. Elkins v. United States,364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
200. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
201. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
202. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) (White, J., dissenting); Inbau, 
Playing God: 5 to 4, 57 J. CRIM. L. 377 (1966); H. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929 (1965). 
203. The practice is not without precedent: 
"'When luse a word,'.Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what 
I choose it to mean -neither more nor less.' 
"'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different 
things.' 
.. 'The question is.' said Humpty Dumpty. 'which is to be the master-that's all ... • 
L. CARROLL. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 299-300 (Gosset and Dunlop ed.). 
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Many have felt that the Warren Court went too far in protecting the 
rights of criminal defendants. Re-evaluation of its decisions by a newly 
constituted Court, with a different philosophical bent, is expected and 
appropriate. The traditions of our jurisprudence, however, lead us to 
expect that constitutional issues will not be reached when the case can 
be decided on narrower grounds, and that decisions will be no broader 
than they need be to reach the issues of a particular case. It was on this 
point that the Warren Court drew some of its harshest rebukes from 
"strict constructionists. " 
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is.,,204 This power, under our Constitution, 
reposes nowhere else. If our highest Court, in haste to reformulate the 
law, misrepresents what the law has been, then it arrogates to itself the 
function of law-making so that justice is no longer defined by law, but 
by the men of the Court. 
Barbara Mello 
204. Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. 137 (1803), cited in United States v. Nixon, _ U.S. ~ 94 S 
Ct. 3090 (1974). 
